Asymmetric Information and Non-Performing Financing: Study in the Indonesian Islamic Banking Industry by Rodoni, A. (Ahmad) & Yaman, B. (Bahrul)
Al-Iqtishad: Jurnal Ilmu Ekonomi Syariah (Journal of Islamic Economics)
Volume 10 (2), July 2018
P-ISSN: 2087-135X; E-ISSN: 2407-8654
Page 403 - 416
Received: January 5, 2018; Revised: February 25, 2018; Accepted: March 15, 2018
State Islamic University (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta. Jl. Ir. H. Juanda No. 95, Banten, Indonesia
E-mail: 1ahmad.rodoni@uinjkt.ac.id, 2bahrul.yaman@uinjkt.ac.id
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15408/aiq.v10i2.7392
Abstract. The purposes of this study are: First, to analyze the indications of moral 
hazard and adverse selection on Indonesian Islamic commercial banks. Second, to 
analyze the influence of moral hazard and adverse selection on the Non Performance 
Financing of Indonesian Islamic banks.  This study uses Error Correction Model 
(ECM) as a tool of analaysis. The results show that the indications of moral hazard 
have a positive effect on the non-performing financing (NPF) in the short run. 
The indication of the presence of moral hazard occurs at the long run on GDP 
variable, and the allocation of Murabaha financing (RM) has a positive effect on 
the mudharabah (FM) profit and loss sharing. The test results also show that adverse 
selection that represented by the profit sharing rate (PSR) has a positive effect on the 
level of risk sharing toward non-performing financing (NPF) in the long run.
Keywords: asymmetric information, moral hazard, adverse selection, Islamic banks
Abstrak. Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah: Pertama, untuk menganalisis indikasi 
moral hazard dan adverse selection pada bank-bank komersial Islam Indonesia. 
Kedua, menganalisis pengaruh moral hazard dan adverse selection terhadap tingkat 
pembiayaan bermasalah bank syariah Indonesia.  Penelitian ini menggunakan 
Error Correction Model (ECM) sebagai alat analisis. Hasilnya menunjukkan 
bahwa indikasi bahaya moral memiliki efek positif pada pembiayaan bermasalah 
(NPF) dalam jangka pendek. Indikasi keberadaan moral hazard terjadi pada 
jangka panjang pada variabel PDB dan alokasi pembiayaan murabahah memiliki 
efek positif pada tingkat bagi hasil mudharabah. Hasil pengujian menunjukkan 
juga bahwa adverse selection yang diwakili oleh tingkat bagi untung (PSR) 
memiliki pengaruh positif terhadap tingkat pembagian risiko terhadap tingkat 
pembiayaan bermasalah (NPF) dalam jangka panjang.
Kata Kunci: informasi asimetris, moral hazzard, adverse selection, perbankan syariah
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Introduction
The development of Islamic banking over the world and especially in 
Indonesia has experienced significant growth. Ernst & Young report in (2012) 
on research in the MENA (the Middle East and Nort Africa) concluded that the 
average growth of Islamic banking per year about more than 20 percent while the 
conventional banking is less than 9 percent. Islamic banks increase not only in 
numbers but in also the coverage area. This fact shows that the market share of 
Islamic banks is growing. At the same time, the social demand for Islamic banking 
services also increased in accordance. This positive trend is not without obstacles; 
issues that are micro and macro dynamics have become inseparable from those 
growths. These issues had become inseparable, indirectly intertwined with the 
growth of Islamic banking as it is today. On the other hand, the consequences of 
follow-up showed a negative trend in the form of high levels of non-performance 
loan (from now on called NPF (Non-Performing Financing). The Islamic banking 
system, use the term Non-Performance Finance (NPF) that is known as the ratio 
of defaulting financing on total financing; in the conventional banking system, 
the term used is non-performance loan (NFL). Belek (2013) state that there is the 
asymmetrical risk upstream in Islamic banking.
The NPF is one of the key indicators to assess the performance of a bank, 
with the theory proven that lower the NPF the better the performance of the 
bank, and vice versa the higher the NPF, the poorer the bank performance 
(Haneef et al., 2012). Therefore, the NPF is one threat toward the liquidity, 
solvency, and profitability of a bank. To overcome this matter, it is needed an 
effort to ensure that the existence of Islamic banks in Indonesia is not threatened 
by bankruptcy.
Kennedy (1973) argues that the main cause of the NPL is the neglect of 
the precautionary principle and action of moral hazard, or a not healthy lending/
borrowing process. Violation of the principle of prudence in granting credit or loans 
engineering is of a systemic nature if done in a highly sophisticated way. According 
to Scott (2003), the banking crisis essentially began in reckless loans, even to 
businesses that were not viable or speculative. This abandonment of the element of 
prudence eventually leads to the creation of conditions that make it difficult for the 
bank itself. While Snyder (2012) stated that the asymmetric information between 
lenders and borrowers, would allow capital flow and cause a problem called moral 
hazard. Karayalcin, et al. (2002) had stated that the asymmetric information and 
uncertainty that are introduced, and only focus on centralized investment level, will 
make capital flows gone astray (moral hazard). 
There are several causes of NFL (the emergence of moral hazard), the not 
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optimal work of the process of credit distribution when credit is distributed with 
and avoidance of internal rules prevailing in the bank, which a deviation either 
intentional or not (Herijanto, 2011). NPL/F can also occur due to the presence 
of an element of collusion; the crime theory said that more than 90% of crimes in 
the banking sector are made in cooperation with the people within the sector itself. 
People, who already understand the intricacies of banking and operational systems, 
are included in these crimes fictitious credit allocation generally makes credit crimes. 
Also, the behavior of collusion between the bank as the creditor and the debtor, who 
was committed from the beginning (Mohammed, 2005).
Non-performing loans are caused by conspiracy factors (self-dealing), 
which are collusive, and are affected by the concerned parties with the credit 
applicant, may lead to an assessment that is objective, unfair, inaccurate, and 
not thorough (Siahaan, 2010). Not to mention that the loans are granted by 
superior instruction. In other words that the loan process has been influenced 
by the parties with interest in credit disbursement. Sutojo (2008) argues that 
there are some causes that come from the internal management of the bank that 
could lead to NPL, such as low ability or the sharpness of the bank in analyzing 
the creditworthiness, and so forth. Thus it can be said that non-performing 
loans are a result of the failure of the bank’s internal management, all the above 
conclusions, in the end, point out the internal management of the bank, which 
is not professionally conducted (Supramono, 2009). Sapuan (2016) said that the 
profit sharing financing had become less preferable if we compared to Islamic debt 
financing instruments. This is caused by the existence of asymmetric information 
in profit sharing financing.
Departing from this fact, as a concern of academic researchers, we had 
considered necessary to do research on asymmetric Information (moral hazard 
and adverse selection) in the mechanism of financing in Islamic banking especially 
with the scheme of mudharaba financing. The purpose of this study is first to 
analyze the indications of moral hazard and adverse selection on the mudharaba 
financing of some Indonesian Islamic Banks (Bank of BRI Shariah, Bank of 
Shariah Bukopin, and Bank of BJB Shariah). Secondly, analyze the effect of moral 
hazard and adverse selection on the Non-Performance Financing of those Islamic 
Banks.
Literature Review
The research conducted by Noorsy about moral hazard aimed to analyze 
the effect of moral hazard on macroeconomic stability. The study population was 
state-owned banks (Limited Bank), National Private Banks, joint venture banks, 
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and foreign banks, a total number of 10 banks; Mandiri Bank, BCA, BNI, BRI, 
Danamon Bank, BII, Permata Bank, Panin Bank, Bukopin Bank, and CitiBank. 
By using quantitative analysis in the form of Structural Equation Modeling 
with a Partial Least Square (PLS) method. The quantitative test results of the 
study show that moral hazard in banking does not have a significant impact on 
macroeconomic stability. The object of his research was conventional banks; 
therefore the area of Islamic banks wasn`t studied, as it will be in this present 
paper. 
The research conducted by Djohanputro and Kountur (2007) and 
Herijanto (2011), the entitled effect of personal qualifications, the Institution 
Environment, and Environmental processes as well as the lending/financing 
control toward the emergence of NPL/NPF: comparative Study on conventional 
and Islamic banks in Indonesia. These two studies are similar, i.e., have a 
common objective, which is to determine the factors that may affect the 
NPL. The difference is that the first research case study was on rural banks 
(BPR), while the second was conducted to determine the effects of internal 
management factors on the emergence of NPL/NPF, with the object of research 
being conventional and Islamic banks. 
The research conducted by Rayner (1991) focused on the issue of contract 
(contract regarding Islamic banks). Rayner also investigated the actions related 
to fraud concluded by stating that financing problems that are intentionally 
caused by a customer can be referred as an act of fraud that cannot be justified 
by norms and laws. This study concluded that the act of fraud is a form of 
moral hazard. Much further research related to non-performance loan (NPL) 
have been made, among other the one conducted by Shrestha (2011), a study 
to ascertain the determining factor of the non-performance loan (NPL) in 18 
commercial banks in Nepal, using a descriptive statistical approach, trend and 
econometric factors models. Shrestha had concluded that based on comparative 
studies that measured from those commercial banks in the financing direction, 
the results obtained was positive. This result indicated a declining value of NPL, 
which have an impact on the performance of the banking industry in Nepal. 
In contrast to the results of the research conducted by Hou and Dickinson 
(2010) who stated that there was no substantial evidence that moral hazard is 
part of the (reasons) why the NPLs increase in the banking industry. On the 
contrary, the increasing NPL interpreted as a positive correlation between the 
performance of NPL and loan growth. 
From all of these studies related to financing, specifically, those one related 
to asymmetric information issues (moral hazard and adverse selection) regarding 
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its effects on the financing performance have not yet been done. For that reason, 
we assume that this present research is essential and urgent to be conducted to 
bridge the value gap and find out about whether or not is the practice of asymmetric 
Information (moral hazard and adverse selection) in the scheme of mudharaba 
financing in Islamic banking sector.
Method
The study includes a variety of elements that are very complex regarding 
the indications of asymmetric information (moral hazard and adverse selection) by 
customers. To test the influence of Non performance Financing we used several 
variables, such as: Gross Domestic Product, inflation, banking policy which is 
represented by the return generated by the ratio of Murabaha margin (MM) against 
mudaraba profit loss sharing (MPLS), the allocation of finance is represented by the 
Murabaha financing ratio (RM) toward mudaraba financing (FM), and the level of 
revenue sharing. 
Other data was collected from agency-officer (especially marketing officers) 
and debtors. The sampling technique used in this research is the probability sampling, 
with proportionate stratified random sampling technique. The samples in this study 
are Bank of BRI Shariah, Bank of Sharia Bukopin, and Bank of BJB Shariah. This 
study is a descriptive one, with a qualitative and a quantitative approach, about the 
secondary data collected using data acquisition instrument of the factors that appear 
as variables, which were analyzed using the Error Correction Model (ECM).
ECM models used in this study has been freed from an-stationary issues 
models through the stationary test, a test of the degree of integration, cointegration 
classical assumption test, so the ECM models used in this test was viable. Below is 
the ECM model used:
DNPF = β0 + β1D(GDP)t+ β2D(INF)t+ β3D(MM_MPLS)t + β4D(RM_FM)t+ β5ECT(-1)
Where:
NPF = Rasio Non-Performing Financing
GDP = Gross Domestic Product 
INF  = Inflation
MM_MPLS = Murabaha margin toward profit loss sharing mudharabah
RM_FM = Murabaha to mudharabah financing
PSR  = Profit Sharing Rate
ECT = Resid (-1)
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Result and Discussions
Asymmetric Information (Moral Hazard)
Asymmetric information on financing is one aspect that can cause the risk 
of moral hazard. As described by Murray (2011) the deviation of the data shows 
the evidence of the existence of asymmetric information. At Bank of BRI Shariah, 
based on interviews with the account officer who explained that asymmetric 
information could occur because of the customer has more information on the 
financial data compared with the bank officers themselves. Customers, to make 
a deposit, dishonesty in the customer business reporting development use this 
information. These actions of the customer consisting of not providing the right 
report or the operation of keeping secret some aspects to the banks are a form of 
moral hazard. Another factor that causes asymmetric information comes from the 
fact that the banks do not perform oversight and monitoring of the development 
of the customer’s business. Although in principle, the bank cannot interfere 
with the customer’s business, but the bank is allowed to conduct supervision and 
guidance of the customer’s business to make sure that the mudharaba financing is 
not in a loss trend. 
The cause of financing risk at Bank of BRI Shariah bank is the reimbursement 
default from the cooperative’s customers. Bank of BRI Shariah mudharaba financing 
product customer is the corporate employees, the possibility of failure to pay back 
the loan is therefore due to employees layoff. Members of the cooperative as a final 
user, are not able to pay the loans to the cooperative, so has an enormous impact on 
it; that impact is the reason why the payments installment of the cooperative to the 
Bank of BRI Shariah bank are impaired.
We`ve got from the interviews with Bank of BJB Shariah bank some 
explanations about the kind of moral hazard caused by customers, some customers 
do duplication or falsification of securities as a guarantee and then use those securities 
as collateral to obtain loans from other banks. This result means that the customer 
by this move will get from assurances two loans from two different banks. When a 
customer makes a doubling of collateral in the form of securities, he can sell those 
guarantees while on the other hand; those guarantees are utilized by another bank 
as a loan guarantee.
Based on these interviews with Bank of BJB Shariah we can conclude that the 
kind of moral hazard that occurs is also caused by negligence on the management 
part of banks in conducting checks of customers financing application documents. 
Some customers to commit fraud, which could harm the entire bank industry, use 
these negligences from the bank management side. Bank of BJB Shariah performs 
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periodic monitoring actions once a month, to minimize the occurrence of acts of 
moral hazard by customers. Those monitoring are also conducted with the aim that 
the bank will have an eye on his customer’s business development in each period. 
Monitoring is a form of risk mitigation for Bank of BJB Shariah, and they`re 
conducted to avoid abuse or misuse.
Bank of Shariah Bukopin gives a loan to his customers by conducting a 
strict client selection. This is to avoid the risk of moral hazard where customers 
can misuse the funds, which is not by the contract. The emergence of the 
financing risk caused by customers who did not issue self-financing or funding 
comes entirely from the bank so that it can trigger customer negligent in running 
the business. Asymmetric information that may occur in the customer financing 
occurred when the customers deliberately commit fraud in the process of reporting 
of the business development. The financial statements of the client’s business are 
a guideline for the banks to determine the customer’s business development. If 
the customer intentionally manipulates the financial statement, for example, the 
customer makes a markup on the expenses so that on the report of the revenue the 
amount of income will be small. This action will certainly have an impact on the 
calculation of profit sharing between the bank and the customer and between the 
bank and its depositors. 
From these three banks, the object of this study we can conclude that the 
risk of moral hazard could be caused by asymmetric information. Asymmetric 
information caused by two factors: internal factors and external factors. Internal 
factors derived from bank employees associated with the procedure of financing. 
External factors are obtained from the customer recipient of financing. Internal 
factors occurred because of bank`s lack of proficiency in the analysis of the 
customer financing petition filing. Financing analysis is factors that influence the 
decision of the committee in analyzing the financing of customer request. Errors 
in the analysis will lead to some losses for banks.
Adverse Selection
Adverse selection occurs before a contract, where the customer willingly 
provides data and information that are false to get his applications for financing 
acceptable by the bank. Banks do not check the documents of customers. Therefore 
they provide financing to customers who are not eligible. An internal account officer 
makes Bank of Shariah Bukopin feasibility customer selection study, is performed by 
an internal account officer, so it is feared that it appears personal interests between 
that accounts officer and customers. This personal interest sparks the occurrence of 
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adverse selection, customers who are not eligible for financing, because of account 
officer`s interests on those customers, their application form for financing became 
accepted and then be realized.
Adverse selection faced by Islamic banks, namely the information and data 
provided to the Islamic banks in the form of false data, ranging from identity 
cards, office address, and type of false collateral. Manipulation of data is also made 
by some customers’ oo their bank accounts for the sake of obtaining financing. 
Forgery against a bank account, for example, few months before the submission 
of financing application, the value of savings of the customer increase, and after 
the financing is realized and to the check, those savings the bank figure out that 
those savings values were fictitious. Some other customers portray themselves 
as a having good character, and therefore worthy to obtain financing. Banks 
make mistakes by providing financing to customers who have false data, due 
to the negligence of banks in customer selection. Banks are overconfident with 
documents provided by customers; they do not follow the principle of 5C in the 
analysis of financing.
Adverse selection occurs because banks don`t have enough information 
about the reputation and the real financial condition of customers. This limitation 
is due to the lack of transparency among banks. Bank of BRI Shariah on our 
interview had explained that the absence of transparency of information among 
banks is also one of the causes of adverse selection. Adverse selection may also occur 
due to the behavior of employees of the bank itself. Bank employees knowingly 
approved the financing request of some customers, but the administration and 
analysis done to those customers would show that they were not eligible for 
financing. Because of the relationship between the bank employees and the 
customers, the financing can be easily approved. Internal factors within the banks 
can also be the source of the emergence of adverse selection. Adverse selection 
negatively affects a bank that faces financing problems. Adverse selection can also 
be the cause of moral hazard. 
The Result of Error Correction Model 
In conducting the ECM test, we run several tests as the prelude to assure of 
the quality of data, namely data normality test, data linearity test, stationary data 
test, integration test, the degree of co-integration test and classical assumption 
(multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation). The results show us no 
data quality violation; we then run the ECM test. Error Correction Model is one 
approach used to analyze the time series model used to study the consistency 
relationships between the short-run and the long run of the tested variables. 
 411
http://journal.uinjkt.ac.id/index.php/iqtishad
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15408/aiq.v10i2.7392
Ahmad Rodoni. Asymetric Information and Non-Performing Financing
D(NPF) = β0 + β1 D(GDP)t + β2 D(INF)t + β3 D(MM_MPLS)t + β4 D(RM_FM)t + 
β5D(PSR)t + β6 ECTt
The long run is a period that allows to hold a full adjustment of any changes 
that arise, to indicate the extent to which changes in the independent variable the 
dependent variable is in full conformity. The ECM result can be seen in Table 1. 
Table 1. ECM Long-run Results
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-statistics Prob
C 0.666651 0.532800 1.251221 0.2149
GDP 0.000008 0.0000009 8.867696 0.0000
INF -0.166393 0.522124 -0.318685 0.7509
MM_MPLS -0.046444 0.004821 -1.036209 0.3036
RM_FM -0.590365 0.116055 -5.086949 0.0000
TBH 0.026969 0.009043 2.982228 0.0039
R-squared 0.545206 F-statistics 17.26270
Adj R-square 0.513623 Prob 0.00000
Source: data processing
Table 1 shows that the ECM test results in the long run, simultaneously 
all the independent variables (GDP, inflation, MM_MPLS, RM_FM and PSR) 
significantly have impact on NPF. That is shown by the value of the F prob (statistically 
equale to 0.000000), meaning that the independent variables are significant at the 
significance level of 1%. the results of the partial test shows that GDP and PSR 
(profit sharing rate) positively significantly affect NPF and the variable RM_FM 
(murabaha financing allocation toward mudharaba financing) has a significant and 
negative effect on NPF at 1% level of significancy, while inflation and MM_MPLS 
(murabaha margin toward mudaraba profit-loss sharing) has significantly no impact 
on NPF. 
Furthermore, from the above results, can be seen the long-run residual 
value, this residual value is used to estimate the short-run equation. The short-run 
equation results obtained by using Error Correction Model (ECM) a data processing 
approach shown on Table 2.
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These short-run estimation results indicate that simultaneously all independent 
variables have a significant effect on NPF at the level of significance of 5%, but 
partially no independent variable has a substantial impact on the NPF. The ECT 
coefficient value as shown in the results of the analysis above is equal to -0.318089 
meaning that the balance. The development of NPF in the previous period was 
adjusted to the current period is equal to 31.8089% with a probability of 0.0013, 
which certify the authenticity of the model`s specification and can indeed explain 
the variations of the dependent variable. 
Table 2. ECM Short run Results 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-statistics Prob
C -0.022528 0.068071 -0.330954 0.7417
D(GDP) 0.0000077 0.0000054 1.433048 0.1563
D(INF) -0.493276 0804480 -0.613162 0.5418
D(MM_MPLS) 0.000475 0.027282 0.017413 0.9862
D(RM_FM) -0.455806 0.392352 -1.161729 0.2493
D(TBH) 0.002545 0.005007 0.508243 0.6129
ECT(-1) -0.318089 0.094920 -3.351112 0.0013
R-squared 0.178483 F-statistics 2.534695
Adj R-square 0.108067 Prob 0.028055
Source: Eviews 8 (data processing)
Interpretations of the ECM Test Results in the long and the short run: 
The GDP Variable (Gross Domestic Product) has a significant and positive effect 
on NPF at the long run, while in the short run it has no significant impact. 
This result indicates, in the long run, the occurrence of moral hazard represented 
by GDP in Islamic banking. The variables inflation and MM_MPLS (Murabaha 
margin toward mudharaba profit loss sharing) at both the long and the short-run, 
has no significant effect on NPF, which mean no moral hazard identification. 
The variable Murabaha financing allocation (RM) toward mudharaba profit-loss 
sharing (FM) at the long run has a significant and adverse effect on NPF, while in 
the short run does not affect the NPF significantly. This result means that in the 
long run, RM_FM identify the presence of moral hazard, while in the short run 
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there is no indication of moral hazard. PSR variable (profit sharing rate) in the 
long run has a significant and positive effect on NPF, while in the short run PSR 
the variable has no significant impact on NPF. This variable PSR identifies the 
presence of adverse selection on Islamic banking industry in Indonesia. Ameer et 
al. (2012) said that the full-fledged Islamic banks do not provide comprehensive 
disclosure related to a profit-sharing investment account.
Asymmetric information on mudharaba financing as one cause of the risk 
of moral hazard as described by Murray (2011), stating that the deviation of the 
data as evidence of asymmetric information. At Bank of BRI Syariah, we discovered 
that customers have more information on financial data of the corporate business 
compared to the bank officers themselves. In Bank of BJB Shariah, we found that 
there is a kind of action of moral hazard committed by customers; some customers 
do duplication or falsification of securities so that they can use those securities as 
collateral to obtain financing from other banks. Regarding Bank of BJB Shariah 
other results were found, we found out the moral hazard that occurs is also caused 
by negligence from the bank management side in conducting verification on the 
customer financing application document. Sukmana and Suryaningtyas (2016) 
conclude that the role of capital and bank’s performance had an essential part in the 
banking liquidity.
Adverse selection occurs because banks generally don`t have all information 
about the reputation and the financial situation of the customers. This limitation 
is due to the lack of openness between the bank and its customers. At BRI 
Syariah, we found that the lack of transparency regarding information among 
banks is also one of the causes of adverse selection. Adverse selection may also 
occur due to the behavior of employees of the bank itself. Bank employees 
knowingly approved the financing request of some customers, who typically are 
not eligible, this occurred because of the relationship between bank employees 
and some customers. 
Conclusion
The Error Correction Model (ECM) test results show indications of moral 
hazard represented by Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which has a positive effect 
on the non-performing financing (NPF). The variable of MM_FM (Murabaha 
financing toward mudharabah) significantly has an adverse impact on NPF at the 
long run, while the other variables (inflation and the ratio of Murabaha margin 
(MM) toward mudharaba profit and loss sharing (MPLS) did not significantly 
influence the NPF. This result means that the two variables do not indicate the 
existence of moral hazard in the long run in Islamic banking sector. From the test, 
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we also found out that the indications of adverse selection presented by PSR (profit 
sharing rate) that has a positive and significant effect on the NPF. At the short run, 
all the independent variables showed no indication of moral hazard and adverse 
selection. 
Further research can use more comprehensive indicator of moral hazard 
and adverse selection in Islamic banking sector. Researchers then could use more 
sophisticated and complex methods of analysis as well as qualitative approach 
deeper.
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